Vazovs Instructions on siege warfare
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In 1909
General Georgi Vazov was the Inspector of the Engineers and his Instructions were directed especially
to the pioneers, whose activities during the various stages of the siege were
carefully described with the aid of sketches showing the different kind of trenches
and field fortifications that they had to arrange. He paid little attention
to the action of the artillery, giving only brief indications about the role
that it had to play during the preparation and the progress of the attack.
This fact might explain why his lesson was poorly regarded by the artillery
officers before the outbreak of the war against After some
preliminary remarks about the different ways to conquer a fortress, Vazov
focused his attention on the gradual attack, describing the different stages
of the siege and the duties of the different heads of the troops involved in
the operation (the commander of the siege army, the chief of the general
staff, the heads of artillery and engineers, the directors of the telegraph
and railways units and the head of the sector of attack). The text was
innovative, being based on the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war and the
siege of A fortress
should be attacked only if it obstructed the progress of the military
operations; otherwise it should be simply observed by a detachment. The best
way to conquer a fortress was the siege or gradual attack, since abrupt
assault was unsuitable with a great fortress, blockade was a waste of time,
bombardment entailed a great consumption of ammunition and could be
successfully employed only against a fort or a little fortress, and the
accelerated attack could be launched only if the defender made some mistake.
The siege of a fortress should be accurately planned and rapidly executed,
since the raise of the siege had more disastrous consequences than not to
start it at all. Especially the transport and the lines of communications
should be accurately organized, since the movement of the siege park on
common road was very difficult. The siege army
(detachment) should be composed by : the army
general staff with the chief of the artillery, the chief of the engineers and
two staff officers for telegraph and railway troops respectively; some infantry
divisions, whose number was established according with the size of the
fortress; heavy field
artillery : 3 batteries every infantry division; artillery
siege park, composed by 1/3 flat trajectory guns and 2/3 plunging firing
howitzers; pioneers : 2
companies attached to every division and 2 companies in every sector of the
attacked front; pioneer siege
park with trench tools; telegraph and
telephone units; railway troops
with 1 construction and 1 exploitation company; field railway; searchlight unit
with two 60cm and 90cm searchlights attached to every division; air unit with
2 kite and 1 spherical balloons, one for every sector of the siege; medical
service; intendance; the direction
of the lines of communication. Reconnaissance of the fortress.
The first stage of the siege was the reconnaissance of the fortress, carried
out by a cavalry force reinforced by 2 infantry battalions, 2 pioneer
companies, 2 machine-guns detachments and 2 or 3 light howitzers batteries.
Its task was to destroy the enemy communications and the waterworks; to seize the depots, the transports, the rolling stock
and the main technical outfits; to find the enemy outposts and to collect
information about the garrison, its armament and the defences of the
fortress. Advance of the siege army.
The siege army approached the fortress advancing in one or more columns
strictly connected one with another, in order to occupy the outposts that
prevented it to move closer to the enemy and to deploy the siege artillery,
beginning with the front chosen for the decisive attack. It could advance
directly against the fortress only if it had all the means required for a
successful attack : against an active enemy premature advance with field
artillery only might cause the failure of the whole operation. Encirclement (blockade) of the fortress.
The fortress should be blockaded in order to prevent the
garrison to be reinforced or supplied, to keep the residents to evacuate it,
to cut its communications and to lock up the enemy within the limited range
of its fortress artillery fire. An uninterrupted encirclement of the fortress
entailed a great waste of troops that could not be concentrated in the point
of the decisive attack. Therefore the siege army should occupy only the main junctions of the front outside of
the range of the fortress artillery fire, watching the intervals between them
with the cavalry. To avoid that the troops might be defeated in detail, the
posts should be strongly fortified and
firmly connected one with another and with the reserve. Enemy counter-attacks
would be repulsed with the joint action of the reserve and the nearby troops.
The blockade line should be fortified as
soon as it was occupied and gradually reinforced in the aftermath with
artificial hindrances, flanking strongpoint to avoid to be surrounded by the
enemy, and rear positions to prepare counter-attacks. It was a matter of the
highest importance to take care of the roads and of the line of
communications, arranging optical signals and telegraph and telephone
stations. To make easy the command, the blockade line could be subdivided in
sectors with different heads. Operations between the investment of the fortress
and the arrival of the siege artillery. The commander of the
siege army developed a detailed plan of action according with the information
collected by the intelligence in peacetime and the results of the
reconnaissance. For the decisive attack he chose the sector of the forts
ring, whose fall would have the greatest importance for the fate of the fortress
itself. In this stage of the siege, the means of transports, wood and all
kind of materials were assembled in the places choose for the artillery and
the engineer parks; railways, roads, bridges, tunnels etc. were built,
improved or repaired; the outposts of the enemy were attacked to establish
the line that infantry would occupy to protect the siege artillery. In these
combats the troops could be effectively supported by the fire of the field
howitzers and mortars. Infantry main positions the starting points for
further attacks should be fortified on the basis of a plan prearranged by
the head of the Engineers. The frame of the artillery positions should be
constructed under the cover of the advance guards to be finalized and rapidly
occupied as soon as the siege artillery arrived. Artillery combat. The siege artillery was
deployed 2000- Infantry combat. When the enemy artillery
was forced to silence, almost in some sector of the forts ring, infantry
suddenly jumped out and occupied the first firing position (first parallel
line) that would serve as starting point for the following advances.
Afterwards the troops moved further in the same manner, taking advantage of
the pauses of the enemy fire and of the ground features, and reach the last
firing position (last parallel line) that should be near the fort in order to
open a close rifles and machine guns fire. Every new position was fortified
with masked trenches connected with the rear by communication trenches out of
the enemy sight and protected from enfilade fire. The front trenches were
occupied by the chains of infantry, the back ones by the reserves. Before the
attack, the reconnaissance and the construction of the frame of the positions
to be occupied were made by night, in strict silence, under the direction of
the officers of the pioneers. After the first night the profile of the
trenches should be height enough to protect a standing man. Before dawn the
workers came back, the covering chains occupied the trenches that the
following day were enlarged by another squad. The assault
position (last parallel line) should be placed close to the forts ring, be
provided with a lot of exits, offer a good protection to the assault troops
and their equipment and be connected by telegraph and telephone with the head
of the sector, the head of artillery and the engineer park. The ground before
should be accurately reconnoitred by artillery and pioneer officers, who
examined the hindrances and the defences of the enemy (blockhouses,
observation posts, ditches, ramparts, gorges) to determine how they could be
demolished to facilitate the attack. The demolition and the clearance of the
hindrances was carried out methodically, opening passages 8- Before
launching the decisive assault, the field and siege batteries concentrated
their fire at the fortifications that would be attacked in order to destroy
the hindrances, the intermediate and flanking works and the dugouts, and to
terrify the garrison. The forts were attacked both from the front and from
the gorge; at the same time also the interval between the forts were
attacked. The assault was launched suddenly, possibly on a wide front,
starting from the last parallel line, as soon as the enemy was staggered
enough and the fortifications were made almost inoffensive. The storm columns
were composed by infantry, pioneers and sometimes also by heavy field
artillery batteries; the reserves and the artillery stood back ready to
advance. The troops had
been trained in advance; what needed for the assault (hand grenades,
footbridges etc.) and the explosives had been amassed in the last parallel
line the night before the attack. The storm troops reached their starting
points by night, while the pioneers reconnoitred the ground for the last
time, marking the way where the troops had to walk. The attack should start
one hour before the sunset, so infantry could advance under cover of
darkness, when artillery could not support the garrison with its fire. When a
fort was captured, the pioneers inspected it to clean mines from the area. In
the meantime the reserves occupied the last parallel line to be employed if
the enemy launched a counter attack. When a fort could not be silenced or
destroyed before the attack, it was necessary to resort to the slow methods
of the mining warfare, tunnelling under no mans land and laying large
quantities of explosives beneath the fort, to demolish the scarp and the
works flanking the ditch. When a sector
of the defensive line was occupied, the troops should be rapidly redeployed
in order to attack the inner defensive line or the core of the fortress
without giving to the shocked and exhausted enemy the time for resting and
reorganizing. This determination might cause the rapid fall of the fortress. Duties of the head of artillery. The head of
artillery was the assistant of the siege army commander as for the direction
of the artillery units during the attack, and should fulfil his orders. He
took care of the correct use of the field and siege artillery during the
combat, of the timely supply of the ammunition and of the arrangement of the
artillery park. Taking into account the results of the reconnaissance, he
developed the plan for the deployment and the action of the siege batteries,
for the disposition of the main and the intermediate artillery parks, for the
arrangement of the communications between the units and with the rear and for
the supply of ammunition. He asked for the air units, the searchlights and
the technical troops he needed. |