Regulations for heavy quick-firing field artillery

 

 

 

 

The tactics of the heavy field artillery was dealt with two manuals Инструкция за употреблението на тежката полска артилерия в боя (Instructions for the employment of the heavy field artillery in combat) published in 1908 and Устав за строевата служба въ скорострелната гаубична артилерия (Field service regulations for the quick-firing howitzers) published two years later, in 1910.

The first text was introduced before the new quick-firing howitzers had been delivered, and took into account only the old 120mm Krupp and the 150mm Schneider howitzers. The main duty of the heavy field artillery was to support the infantry attacking strong field fortifications and barrage works. It could also get its place in the field battle, supporting the field artillery against the enemy field guns. Their emplacements should be chosen so that they were able to fulfil their tasks without being moved.

The Regulations, on the other hand, regarded as heavy field artillery only the 120mm howitzers, both Krupp and Schneider, while the 150mm heavy howitzers were assigned to the fortress artillery. As for the service of the piece and of the battery, the text basically followed the directions established for the field artillery, adopting the same arrangements and the same orders.

 

Composition and subdivision.

The 120mm QF howitzer battery had 4 howitzers, 12 ammunition wagons and the transport train. It was subdivided as follows :

    fighting unit : 4 howitzers with 4 ammunition wagons subdivided into two sections, 2 ammunition wagons (1 with shrapnel) as first supply echelon and a cart with observation and communication devices;

    battery reserve : 6 ammunition wagons, a field forge, a wagon carrying tools, reserve troops, reserve horses, hors rang troops and a spare carriage;

    transport train : 8 two-horses carts: 1 field kitchen, 2 food supply carts, 4 forage carts, 1 baggage cart.

The 120mm not QF howitzer battery had 6 howitzers, 18 ammunition wagons (6 with mine shells) and the transport train. It was subdivided as follows :

    fighting unit : 6 howitzers with 3 ammunition wagons subdivided into three sections, 3 ammunition wagons as first supply echelon and a cart with observation and communication devices;

    battery reserve : 12 ammunition wagons, a field forge, a wagon carrying tools, reserve troops, reserve horses, hors rang troops and a spare carriage;

    transport train : 9 two-horses carts: 1 field kitchen, 2 food supply carts, 5 forage carts, 1 baggage cart.

The 150mm battery had 4 howitzers battery, 12 ammunition wagons and the transport train. It was subdivided as follows :

    fighting unit : 4 howitzers with 4 ammunition wagons subdivided into two sections, 2 ammunition wagons as first supply echelon and a cart with observation and communication devices;

    battery reserve : 6 ammunition wagons with mine shells, a wagon carrying tools, reserve troops, reserve horses, hors rang troops;

    transport train : 8 two-horses carts: 1 field kitchen, 2 food supply carts, 4 forage carts, 1 baggage cart.

The train carts were drawn by two horses, all remaining by six.

Every battery had one cart carrying 6 Linnemann spades, 6 picks, 2 axes and 8 little hatchets. In order to provide communication between the units every battery had 4 field telephones with 500 metres of cables each.

 

In battle formation (боен строй) the howitzer was deployed exactly as the field gun, i.e. unlimbered, with the spade sunk into the ground and the ammunition wagon tilted on its left on the same line. The only difference was that the howitzer attended by six servants, besides the commander, instead of five.

 

In route formation (строй за движение) the howitzer was towed by six horses, exactly as the field gun, even if both the limbered howitzer and its ammunition wagon were weightier. As a rule the place of heavy field artillery was in the rear of the main body, but if an attack on a fortified position was foreseen, it should be put forward so that it could quickly come into action. The battery reserve followed the fighting unit of the battery. Marching close to the enemy, all the battery reserves of the division were grouped and moved behind the last battery under the command of the most senior chief of the battery reserves.

 

Projectiles. The field howitzer fired three kind of projectiles : shrapnel, mine shell, and common shell. The shrapnel fired by field guns was considerably superior to that of the howitzers due to the greater penetration of the bullet, a result of the greater velocity of the projectile itself at the point of burst. Actually field howitzers fired more slowly than field gun and had to expend twice the weight of ammunition to produce the same result. To compensate for this, howitzer shrapnel bullets were made heavier than those used in field gun. The superiority of the heavier projectiles stood out when it was necessary to destroy material objects.

Mine or torpedo shells were H.E. shells with thinner walls and a larger cavity for the bursting charge in order to bring up the weight without unduly lengthening the shell. This enabled to shoot with shrapnel and shells without changing ranging tables. They were more dangerous than ordinary H.E. shells, since they contained a quantity of explosive sufficient to destroy the howitzer itself if it burst in the bore. They were adopted by the field howitzers since they needed a powerful shell for attacking field entrenchments.

The common shells, being less effective, were used only by old howitzers and were replaced, whenever possible, by mine shells. The universal shell (Einheitsgeschoss) was adopted only on the eve of the Balkan Wars. Direct fire with time shrapnel was employed against troops immediately behind cover. Percussion fire was used to reach targets under splinter proof covers. Mine shells with delay action fuze were used to penetrate the roof of the covers before bursting.

Since field howitzers fired with several different blasting charges (five for 120mm and 150mm Schneider howitzers, and three for 120mm Krupp howitzers), the Regulations contained detailed information about the careful selection of the elevation and the charge to provide the optimum angle of fall of the projectile.

 

Command. The field howitzers divisions were not organically attached to the Infantry Divisions and did not move always with it, but formed the Army artillery reserve. When some divisions operated together, they were put under the command of the senior division commander, who took the name of “Commander of the heavy field artillery”. When the howitzers operated along with the field artillery, the command was assumed by the senior commanding officer.

 

Employment in combat. When it was the time to come into the action, all the howitzers should be quickly placed in order to fire en masse. As a rule the heavy field artillery opened fire from covered positions and only exceptionally it could avoid to fire above its own troops, in order to repel an attack with direct fire or to intervene in an infantry combat at close quarters. When the available ammunition was scarce, the howitzers should fire only against that targets which were really worth of wasting ammunition.

The might of the howitzers batteries could be successfully employed against stationary targets. Their powerful effect was very effective especially against shielded artillery, with crew protected against direct shrapnel fire, as well as against covered targets in field fortifications, trenches, shelters, high forests etc. Changes of position had to be undertaken only if the conditions of the engagement required it.

 

Attack. In attack the commander of the unit involved fixed the mission that the field heavy artillery should fulfil independently or along with the field artillery, while the head of the artillery assigned the targets and directed the operations of the whole artillery.

As a rule the heavy field batteries at first fired against the enemy artillery and, after having reached the superiority, they concentrated the fire against the point where the main attack of the infantry had been fixed. Against little visible targets a success could be obtained only by mass fire: therefore the batteries of a Division should not shoot on a front of more than 400 metres. The heavy field artillery could effectively support its infantry, but to prevent mistakes, good connections should be established between the howitzers and the advancing troops. Therefore artillery officers and NCOs were attached to the infantry in order to arranged communications with flags of telephones.

In the attack against fortified positions, the heavy artillery batteries should come into action only when the plan of attack was fully established. They came into the selected places covertly or by night, but until the enemy howitzers were not located, the opposing line should be bombed by the shrapnel of the field artillery.

The main task of the heavy field artillery was to weaken the enemy heavy artillery. When this goal was achieved, part of the field artillery should neutralize it, while the remaining part along with the howitzers was assigned to the preparatory bombardment of the area chosen for the break-through. The action of the infantry should be strictly co-ordinated with the artillery fire. The effect of the heavy field artillery fire was greater when the infantry attack forced the enemy to occupy its fighting line. The main task of the commander of the unit was exactly to co-ordinate the gradual deployment of the infantry with protection offered by the artillery fire.

 

Defence. In defence the main task of the heavy field artillery was to fight against the enemy batteries in order to overwhelm them. It came into position only when the direction of the enemy attack was clear, in order to avoid the inconvenience of a premature displacement and to prevent the enemy to locate its disposition.

At first it should fire along with the field artillery against the opposing batteries that were visible, and then it turned against those batteries, whose fire had been only perceived. It had to fulfil this task even when the field artillery took upon itself the defence against the enemy infantry attack. It had to intervene against the enemy infantry only when the decisive attack was launched.