The field artillery in Balkan campaign

In his essay cpt. Bellenger pointed out with great accuracy merits and limits shown by the Bulgarian artillery during the war against the Ottoman Empire. He stated that, if the Turks proved to be inadequate, the Serbian artillery generally speaking was more aggressive, well-trained and effective than the Bulgarian one. He blamed especially the tendency of the Bulgars to use the artillery only to close support of infantry and to fire at the extreme ranges of the guns.

Looking into the conduct of the two Balkan armies, he stressed that the main differences between the offensive at Lule Burgas and Kumanovo were two, the grouping of the artillery, and the depth of formation. The Bulgarian artillery, spread out along the Karagatch, was nowhere powerful enough to open a breach for its infantry. Thus the infantry, almost abandoned to itself, had to wait for night to clear the last few hundred meters which separated it from the enemy. When it had cleared this distance it was exhausted and thrown into disorder. No compact reserve followed close behind to clinch the success. Thus infantry was at the mercy of an offensive return, which the Turks did not attempt. The best that the Bulgars could do was to hug the conquered ground and reorganize on the spot. They took hours to get into condition to advance further, and when they were able to do so, the enemy had been able to recuperate and establish himself in a new position.

At Kumanovo the Serbs attacked with a mass of artillery sufficient to make a breach. The infantry was then able to dislodge the enemy’s lines by day, and without excessive losses. As the Serbs had considerable reserves behind their lines, and as the attack succeeded by daylight, they at once proceeded to make the most of their successful attack. If, after Kumanovo, the Serbs did not immediately push their success, they did, at least, push the enemy vigorously on the same day.

Therefore Cpt. Bellenger concluded that on the whole the concentration of artillery fire was the factor which decided attacks in a modern war, and a formation of reasonable depth was the true means of shortening combats by launching fresh troops through the enemy’s lines. In his opinion it was not the progress of modern technique which prolonged the battles and gave time for the construction of trenches, but, rather, the indecision of the leaders or mistakes in the conduct of the operations.

Distribution of the artillery

After a brief description of the composition of the Bulgarian infantry division, equivalent in effective strength to a French army corps, cpt. Bellenger remarked that it had at its disposal only 36 quick-firing guns, instead of 120, as a French army corps. He thought erroneously that the reserve batteries armed with 87mm not quick-firing Krupp guns were used only during the siege of Odrin, being absent in the Thracian battlefields. However his remarks were worth considering, since not quick-firing guns played only a marginal rôle during the war.

Although the theoretical organization of the Bulgarian artillery corresponded with the idea of an artillery entirely under the direct orders of a general commanding a force equivalent to an army corps, its employment in no way corresponded with this conception. In fact the Bulgarian division was divided into three brigades which, organically, had neither cavalry nor artillery. Throughout the campaign as a rule these brigades operated independently, marching on separate itinerary and fighting side by side. As each of them claimed the assistance of the artillery, the division commander usually assigned the three groups in advance to the three brigades. In their turn, the brigade commanders generally split up the groups at their disposal. Therefore, the siege of Odrin excepted, there was no action in which the Bulgarian artillery was employed en masse and furthermore it could never boast of having played a decisive rôle.

Cpt. Bellenger explained this dispersion of the artillery with the lack of teams in time of peace. Since the Bulgarian artillery division horsed no more than one firing battery, the Bulgars could not acquire practice in the manoeuvre of it.

The Serbs, having the same number of quick-firing guns for weaker divisions (16 battalions instead of 24), were proportionately stronger in artillery and their division commanders never relinquished control of the artillery in favour of their subordinates. During the battles fought in Macedonia, they always used only part of the batteries for the support of their infantry, keeping in reserve powerful masses of artillery ready to make the breach at the point chosen by the commander for obtaining the decision.

However, if necessary, the Serbs were able to effectively split up their artillery units. During the battle of Monastir the artillery of the Morava Division, having to fire against several targets at that time, broke up one battery into four sections, each commanded by an officer, and each acting as a battery. Sweeping and rapidity of fire helped out the numerical deficiency in guns.

Employment of the artillery

1. Emplacement of the batteries – In Thrace, after the battle of Lozengrad, the Bulgarians operated over terrain with gentle slopes, which they used by drawing back from the covering crests. This needed distant observation stations and the use of telephones. Since the Turkish artillery generally declined the duel, the usual rôle of the Bulgarian artillery was to support their own infantry, but the slowness of transmission of commands was often an obstacle to the opportune delivery of their fire.

In Macedonia, the Serbs ordinarily approached close to the covering crests, and this method permitted a better use of their rapidity of fire. The Turks seemed to had ignored indirect fire.

2. Occupation of the positions – All the belligerents declared that a battery seen moving within gun range was a battery annihilated. Anxiety for cover during the march of approach frequently caused the Bulgarians to employ their guns at ranges greater than 5,000 meters. The Serbs, in this respect, were less timid and often they moved their batteries during the night, over ground that during the day was under fire. Thus they were able to deploy their guns even at 1,500 to 2,000 meters from the enemy.

Even this time cpt. Bellenger explained this difference with the organization of the two armies in peacetime. While the Serbs had about 180 horses for three batteries, the Bulgars had only 90 for two batteries, including the horses of the cadre of the 3^rd battery, which was formed only on mobilization. This meant that the Serbian battery had on the battlefield twice as many instructed drivers and horses accustomed to manoeuvre.

3. Preparation of the fire – The officers of all the belligerents generally considered the method of forming the sheaf of fire too complicated, and of little utility in war, where it was generally necessary, from the opening of fire, to break up the regularity of the sheaf in order to direct the planes of fire on the important points of the target. The only precaution really necessary in the formation of the sheaf was not to cross the planes of fire.

4. Execution of fire – All the belligerents declared that their adversaries fired too high, and that such high bursts had no effect. However Bulgarians and Serbs claimed to have fired very low for the identical reason of the want of effect of high bursts. According to the Bulgarians, the fire of the Turks, while generally very high bursting, was very irregular. This might be explained by the tendency to fire at the extreme ranges of the guns in order to have the communications to the rear well covered, since at distances of 5,000 meters and beyond, the heights of burst became very irregular, and the normal height in mils corresponded to a considerable absolute height. The remaining velocity of the shrapnel was small and the fire of little effect. The shrapnel and the time shell seemed to have been equally feared by the infantry. Against the latter, which had a very wide open sheaf, the Bulgarian infantry often protected themselves in their trenches by covering their heads with their entrenching spades.

5. Effect of fire – While the Serbs were said to have produced important destructive effects In Macedonia, in Thrace, these effects seemed to have been rare, while neutralization and immobilization were frequent. Anyway the artillery’s power of immobilization was considerable.

Cpt. Bellenger thought that both Bulgarians and Turks had feared too much the enemy’s artillery fire. In fact the Turkish troops, badly officered and composed of a great number of reservists without instruction, were almost always entrenched. Their immobility could be attributed as much to their faults of organization as to the guns of their enemy. On the contrary, the Bulgarians, although keen to advance, always entrenched as soon as they came under artillery fire. This employment of entrenchments extended from the firing line to the reserves, and numerous trenches were constructed only to protect against artillery fire and without themselves affording any field of fire.

The Serbs also sought protection against artillery fire. However, the trenches dug for their reserves were echeloned in depth and so placed as to have a field of fire. While protecting the reserves against artillery fire, they have also concerned themselves with the eventual use of the trenches against a return of the hostile infantry.

Finally cpt. Bellenger remarked that often the principal rôle of the artillery was simply to offer a moral support to the infantry, especially when the use of too much defilade interfered with the opportune delivery of fire on account of slowness of transmission of commands.

6. Fire on different targets – The Bulgarian Army neutralized entrenchments by shrapnel fire and attacked them at night with the bayonet, while the Serbs carried trenches by day by close cooperation between the infantry and artillery.

As for the attack of the hostile artillery, having seen the danger of destruction to a battery seen in motion, Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks employed the maximum ranges of their pieces, rather than cross an exposed area. During the whole war in the open field as well as in siege operations, the destruction of guns was always the result of oblique or flank fire.

The duel between concealed batteries was almost useless. In such a case, instead of prolonging the artillery duel, the best option was to give direct support to the advance of one’s own infantry. This infantry, by advancing, could either make an attack on the concealed battery or seize a more advantageous position for our guns.

7. Consumption of ammunition – Even if he could not get any exact figures, Cpt. Bellenger remarked that the expenditure of ammunition during the war exceeded all expectations and that resupply was very difficult. The stop of the Bulgarian Army after Lule Burgas, and that of the Serbs on the Vardar after Kumanovo, appeared to be due in great measure to the necessity for filling the empty wagons before proceeding further.

8. Aerial observation – Cpt. Bellenger greatly reduced the rôle played by the aviation during the war, affirming that artillery never used balloons or aeroplanes for the observation of masked targets. Because of lack of previous preparation, aerial means of observation were almost entirely wanting, in spite of the presence of aviators.

Use of heavy artillery and howitzers

Cpt. Bellenger opinion about heavy artillery were of great interest. At that time in France the rôle of the heavy artillery in modern warfare caused a rather heated debate. In January 1911, after having assumed the position of Chief of the General Staff, gen. Joffre presented to the Supreme War Council a memorandum citing German developments in mobile field howitzers and heavy artillery and recommended that the French army adopt both a light field howitzer and organize mobile heavy artillery from existing equipment. In the a special Commission of New Materiéls was established under the presidency of general de Lamothe in order to test heavy weapons.

The French school, however, emphasizing that “speed is the key quality of the attacker” (Langlois), preferred light artillery and believed that the answer to any firepower problem was to add more 75-mm guns. Unlike gen. Herr, cpt. Bellenger felt that in operations which developed rapidly, and especially if there was much manoeuvre, the heavy artillery would rarely find employment.

He emphasized that during the Balkan war heavy artillery was used only exceptionally and only by reason of its range and power and not on account of the curvature of its trajectory. The Bulgarians did not use howitzers, except during the siege of Odrin and the attack to the Chataldzha line, while in the battle of Bunar-Hissar the they did not used howitzers because they needed curved trajectories or powerful pieces, but because of a critical situation which required the use of all available resources.

The Serbs used their heavy gun also during the attack of a mountain position, against which the field artillery could find no position. A 120mm. gun, brought up to a distance slightly greater than 10 kilometres, opened fire, after having buried its trail in order to increase the range. This fire was very successful, not because it was really effective, but because it demoralized the Turks, who were surprised at receiving big projectiles where they believed themselves to be sheltered from all artillery fire.

But he thought that the services that they rendered did not compensate for the inconveniences involved in their use. In fact if the enemy was entrenched in a defensive position, his position was known before the combat and it was possible to use against him the light guns and the use of the heavy artillery was not justified.