Some teachings of the war in the Balkans
on the tactical and
technical employment of artillery
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The artillery in Macedonia In the first
two parts of his research gen. Herr analysed the causes of the Serbian
victories at Kumanovo and Monastir. After having visited the two battlefield
and having met some Serbian officers – among them the deputy chief of staff
col. Misic, the head of the artillery, col. Milivojevich, the head of the
Engineer Corps, col. Ilich, the head of the artillery school, col.
Milosavlevitz, and the commander of the horse artillery, maj. Todorovich – he
could draw the following conclusions :
1.
Artillery was
able to destroy its targets. Before the war it was usually assumed that
shields would give such complete cover to the gunners that it would be
possible to serve the guns under a heavy fire, and that a battery under cover
might be neutralized, but could not be destroyed. Actually the war
experiences showed this was not always the case. 2.
The artillery
duel was a vital necessity. Having refused the artillery duel, the
Turks lost the whole of the personnel of their artillery. On the contrary the
Serbs, having fought the artillery duel with success, were able to support
their infantry and to succeed in their attack in the open with only slight
losses, while the enemy’s losses were heavy. 3.
Superiority of
oblique fire. At Kumanovo one single Turkish battery firing
obliquely, was able to inflict such losses on the Serbian infantry that it
considerably hindered the advance of the whole 4.
Consumption of
ammunition. The great results obtained by the Serbian artillery were achieved
with a very small expenditure of ammunition (120 rounds on an average per
gun), especially because the Turkish batteries usually were not under cover.
The little consumption of ammunition was attributed by the Serbians to : a) the detailed examination of the ground before
opening fire, b) the employment of observation ladders. Without them, the
transmission of orders would have been difficult, and in order to observe,
commanders of batteries would have had to move to the hill crests at a
distance from their batteries. 5.
Efficay of the
shrapnels. Artillery fire put more men out of action than that of infantry, and
the wounds from shrapnels were always the majority. Furthermore the wounds
from shrapnel bullets took longer to heal than those caused by rifle bullets.
The latter, if they did not kill, only disable for a few days, while the
former disabled for the rest of the campaign. 6.
Advantages of the employment of long range
guns. According with the Commander of the Servian artillery, heavy
artillery was not employed at Monastir for its flat trajectory, but only for
the long range of its guns, and the large capacity of its projectiles. The
employment of long range guns permitted the destruction of the enemy’s
artillery, where the light field guns were powerless. 7.
Employment of
mountain artillery. The two opposite armies employed a considerable
number of mountain guns, that proved to be very
useful in the hilly country. At Monastir, facility of transport on the back
of mules, as well as the high trajectory, permitted mountain guns to
accompany the infantry into action, taking cover behind very steep
declivities. The artillery at Chataldzha In the third
part of his research gen. Herr analysed the causes of defeat of the Bulgarian
attack against the Turkish lines at Chataldzha.
This time he could visit the battlefield from Mahmud Pasha to Hamidie, and
met the deputy commander of the Eastern Army, Abuk Ahmed Pasha, and the
battery commanders of the horse artillery of the 2nd Cavalry
Division. These talks seemed to confirm his previous conclusions. 1.
Necessity of
the artillery duel. The fire of the Bulgarian artillery against the
Turkish Army – infantry and artillery – was quite innocuous, both before and
during the attacks. Having gained the superiority in the artillery duel, the
Turks suffered small losses, while those of their enemy were heavy. This
proved that a frontal attack in open ground could be sure to succeed only if
a definite superiority was obtained by the artillery beforehand. 2.
Necessity of
placing the batteries under cover. In spite of the great
amount of shells fired, the Bulgarian artillery obtained no result, because the
Turkish batteries were well protected under cover. War experience showed that
when the crews dug itself in under ground, nothing could be effected against their artillery, and consequently the
artillery duel was useless. 3.
Ineffectiveness
of field guns firing at great range. The Turks attributed
the inefficiency of the enemy’s batteries at Chataldzha
to the fact that the shell were fired with too great
elevation and burst too high. Hence few of the shell were effective. Some
Bulgarian fuses were found set for 4.
Necessity for
long range guns, with high explosive shells. The Bulgarian field
artillery could not advance under cover within efficient range of the Turkish
batteries. It could obtain superiority in the artillery duel only if it would
be provided with long range guns. Furthermore since the shrapnel fire was
useless against batteries in blindages, the Bulgars should have use high
explosive shell against them. 5.
Necessity for
oblique fire. The Turkish guns firing direct against the
Bulgarians were only at about a range of Teachings and suggestions In the
conclusion of his research, gen. Herr put forward some suggestions, dwelling
especially upon the opportunity of having a fair number of heavy guns, near
the standard 75mm light field guns. His considerations were directed
especially to the French Army, where, according with the prevailing
principles of offensive, the artillery had as only mission to support the
attacks of the infantry. For this reason it needed only a limited range and
its main qualities should be rapidity of fire and mobility. The usefulness of
heavy artillery, powerful but slow and weighty, was not felt often,
especially because nobody believed in field entrenchments. However the
opinion of Gen. Herr was different. 1.
Necessity for
long range guns. Long range guns should be provided a) to obtain a
superiority of fire when, as often happened, only at distances beyond the
effective range of field artillery it was possible to take the enemy in
reverse or in enfilade; b) to reduce the difficulty for the field artillery
to occupy a position in face of an enemy artillery already in position and
ready to assume the initiative; c) to re-establish the numerical equilibrium,
when the ground did not permit all the field artillery to be brought up under
cover and get into position, even in two lines, within effective range of the
opposing batteries already in position. Having
to act in conjunction with the lighter field batteries in the artillery duel,
these long range batteries should be capable of getting into position at the
same time as the light batteries, if not before them. They must also fire
under the same conditions and with the same rapidity. Consequently the long
range guns should be quick-firing and easily moving on all sorts of ground. 2.
Necessity for
high explosive shells. The projectile of the heavy artillery should be a
sort of shrapnel, whose effect should not be too local, enabling it to reach
the personnel under cover, and to destroy artillery material. The universal
shell of the German artillery would appear to be the sort of projectile
required. It is interesting to remark that the Bulgarian artillery had just
adopted in 3.
Necessity for
improving the observation of the effect of the fire. In order to
verify the range and to properly observe the effect of fire, it was proper to
employ aeroplanes specially attached to the artillery. Moreover all batteries
should be provided with observation ladders and with telemeters or other
range finding instruments. |